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ADMIRALTY.
Cases selected by HORACE L.

CHYNEY.

COLLISION.

i. Demurrage-When not Recoverable-Interest.
Where owners of a vessel damaged by collision elect to have her
sold in her damaged condition, they cannot recover demurrage ; for interest is the legal indemnity for the delay in collecting the balance of her
original value from the wrong-doer: "The La Champagne," District
Court of the United States, Southern District of New York, BROWN, J.,
November 26, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 398.
2.
Ship Participatingin Tug's Fault.
A steamship was taken in tow by two tugs under an agreement that
the tugs should have practical command of her, and the master of one tug
stood upon the ship's deck beside the ship's master and delivered orders,
which were communicated by the latter to the ship's crew. A fault was
committed by the other tug, wherein it was followed by the ship through
orders thus delivered, resulting in a collision with a steamer. Held, that
while the tug was not the mere agent of the ship so as to render the latter
liable under the rule of respondeat superior,yet the ship was a participant in the fault, and on that ground was liable with the tugs: "The
Doris Eckhoff," I Circuit Court of Appeals, 494; 5o Fed. Rep., 134; 1 United
States Court of Appeals, 129, distinguished. "The Empress," Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States, Second Circuit, WALLACE, J.,
October 4, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 890.

CONFISCATION O

VESSEL BY STATE.

3. A aritimeLiens-State Oyster Laws.
Code of Virginia, $ 2186, providing that a sale of a vessel forfeited by
proceedings in the State court for violating the oyster laws of the State
"shall vest in the purchaser a clear and absolute title," is null and
inoperative, in so far as it would divest the maritime liens of innocent
parties attaching before the.arrest of the vessel; and such vessel may be
subsequently seized in the hands of the purchaser, and subjected to such
liens, by proceedings in the Federal Admiralty Courts: Taylor v. Carryl,
2o How., 583, distinguished.
"The Elexena," District Court of the
United States, Eastern District of Virginia, HUGHES, J., November 3o ,
189 2, 53 Fed. Rep., 359.
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CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES

'HIPPING.

4.

Limitation of Liability--Single Claim-Common-Law Action
When not Stayed.
Where there is but a single damage claim, full relief, under Revised
Statutes,
4283, can be had by answer in a common-law suit. Hence
:a petition in an admiralty court to limit liability and to restrain the
-prosecution of a pending common-law action must show the existence,
or probability of existence, of more than one damage claimant, and the
need of an apportionment, in order to make such a special proceeding
-either necessary or appropriate, under .Revised Statutes, H 4284, 4285;
-or else it -must show such a special case as does not admit of the full
statutory remedy upon a single. claim in a common-law suit. Failing
such averments, this Court must observe Revised Statutes, . 563, which
saves to the suitor his common-law remedy, and refuse to entertain the
proceeding or to enjoin the common-law action in the State court on a
single claim, though such claim may exceed the value of the vessel:
" The RosA," District Court of the United States, Southern District of
New York, BROWN, J-, November 3o, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., i32.

'CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
Cases selected by OWEN WISTSR.1
CONTRACT OF FREIGHTAGE.

I. Negligence, Liabilityfor-Limitation of,by Contract.
The shipper, by rail, of a horse worth $I5oo, signed a live-stock contract providing that," the liability of the company for valuable live stock
shall not exceed $ioo for each animal." Held, that this was not merely
-an agreed valuation of the animal, but an attempt to limit the carrier's
xesponsibility for negligence, and was therefore void: Hart v.Railroad
Co., 5 S. C. Rep. 151, 112 U. S., 33r, distinguished; Railroad Co. v. Lock-wood, I7 Wall., 357, followed. The question whether a carrier can stipuaate for exemption for liability for its own negligence is a matter of gen.eral law, upon which the Federal Courts will exercise their own judgment,
independent of State decisions, although jurisdiction attaches merely by
v-irtue of the citizenship of the parties, and the contract was made and to
be performed within the State: Ells v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. Railway
Co., Circuit Court S. D. Iowa, E. D., Woorsox, D. J., 52 Fed. Rep., 9o3.
2. Negligence, Limitation of Liabilityfor,by Contract.
Where a carrier affords shippers no opportunity to contract for the
transportation of freight under its common-law liability," but receives
only upon condition that exemption be accorded it, a contract containing
such exemption is void, and the fact that it was entered into knowingly
by a shipper, and without demand for any different contract, makes no
difference: Little Rock & Ft. S. Railway Co. v. Cravens, Supreme Court
of Arkansas, HumINGWAy, J., December 24, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep., 803.
1

During the temporary absence of Mr. Wister, cases in this departtent will be selected by one of the Editors of the journal.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
PASSENGERS.
3. Carriage beyond Destination.
Plaintiff purchased a ticket over defendant's road, entitling her topassage on its train to one of its stations, but the train carried her a
quarter of a mile beyond her destination, and against her objection theconductor ejected her at that point, and she~was obliged to walk back to,
her station, from which exposure she became sick. Held, (i) a good
cause of action; (2) the action thus arising is on the "implied contract"
to carry plaintiff safely to her destination, and is not an action ex de
licto; (3) in such action the complaint need not set out a copy of theticket: Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kyte, Appellate Court of Indiana,
GAvIN, J., January 17, 1893, 32 N. E. Rep., 1134.
4. Who are-Ticket on Freight Train-Threatsof EjectionNegligence in Jumpiingfrom Train, when Excusable.
A person having a ticket for passage upon a railroad, who boards a
freight train which does not carry passengers, believing the ticket good
on that train, is to be treated as a passenger, and is not a trespasser. If,
in such case, the conductor orders him to get off the train while running
at a speed which would endanger him in getting off, the conductor refusing to stop the train to allow him to get off, and in violent and insulting
language threatens to eject the person from the train by force if such
order is npt obeyed, and has force at his command to execute such threat,
and the person jumps from the train to avoid ejection by force, this is
sufficient compulsioh or show of force to excuse the person from the
charge of contributory negligence in so jumping from the train: Bog-.
gess v. Chesapeake, etc., Railway Co., Supreme Court of West Virginia,
BRANNON, J., December Io, 1892, 16 S. E. Rep., 525.
WAREHOUSEMAN.

5. Lidbility as.
Plaintiff sent three packages of goods by express C. 0. D., and on
arrival at their destination the express company immediately notified.
two of the consignees, who requested that their packages be held a fewdays, to allow them time to pay for them, and the consignee of the third
package could not be found. The company agreed to the request of theconsignees, and immediately notified plaintiffs thereof, and that the consignee of the third package could not be found. Before plaintiffs received.
the notices the company's warehouse was burned, without its fault, and
the goods destroyed. Held, that plaintiffs could not recover from the
company, in that its liability was only that of a warehouseman, and not
of a common carrier: Hasse v. American Express Co., Supreme Court of'
Michigan, GRANT, J., December 22, 1892, 53 N. E. Rep., 918.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases seletted by FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.
AGENcY.
i. Indorsement of Check by Commercial Traveler.
A commercial traveler, employed to sell and take orders for goods,
to collect accounts and receive money and checks payable to the order of'

COMMERCIAL LAW.
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his principal, is not by implication authorized to indorse his principal's
name on the checks, and a bank paying a check on such indorsement
will be responsible to the principal: Jackson v. National Bank of McMinnville, Supreme Court of Tennessee, HoL-mAN,'J., January 5, 1893,
20 S. W. Rep., 8o2.
BILLs AND NOTES.
2. Accommodation Indorsers-Noticeof Non-p ayment.
Accommodation indorsers, who have under their own control and
management all the assets and business of their principal, and whose
duty it is to see that funds are provided and the debt paid, are not
entitled to notice of the dishonor of his promissory note which they
have indorsed., Thus, the directors of an insolvent corporation who,
wishing to raise funds to carry on the corporate business, procure a loan
on a negotiable promissory note made by the corporation, payable to
their order, on demand after date, at a bank, and indorsed by-themselves
individually, are liable as indorsers, without notice of the dishonor of the
note by the corporation: Hull v. Meyers, Supreme Court of Georgia,
BLEcnLvY, C. J., January 6, 1893, 16 S. B. Rep., 653.
Indorsement by CommercialAgent. See AGNcY, supra.
3.

Law Governing Collecion-Placeof Payment.

A note executed in one State, but made payable in another, is, in so
far as the remedy of collection is concerned, to be controlled and governed by the laws of the State where the note is made payable: Drake v.
Found Treasure Mining Co., Circuit Court, District of Nevada, HAwIEY
D. J., November 7, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 474.
'CONTRACT.

4.

Limitation of Liabilityfor Negligence. See CARN.Mis

AND

TRANSPORTATION ComPANInS I, 2.
FRAUDS, STATUT

OF.

5. Promise to pay the Debt of Another.
A promise by plaintiff to the intervener to take up the debt due him
from defendant, if he would not file his mortgage, is void under
the Statute of Frauds; there being no evidence of the promise in
writing, and it also appearing that the intervener did not, in consideration of the promise, release any of his security against defendant, but
continued to press him for payment: Simpson v. Harris, Supreme Court
of Nevada, MURPHY, C. J., January 28, 1893, 31 Pac. Rep., io9.
6.
Where M, at request of G, agrees to pay to C money that he owes by
contract to G, such contract is not within the Statute of Frauds requiring
the promise to pay the debt of another to be in writing. M simply pays
his own debt to a different person than the one he originally agreed to
pay it to. He is paying his own debt, not the debt of another: Casey v.
Miller, Supreme Court of Idaho, SULLIVAN, J., January 31, 1893, 32 Pac.
Rep., i94.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
SURETYSHIP.

7. Disaffirmanceby Infant Princifpal.
The fact that the principal in a bond given for the purchase price of
property was at the time of executing the same an infant, and afterward
disaffirmed the contract, does not relieve the surety on the bond from
liability for the deficiency after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied on the debt: Kyger v. Lipe, Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, LEwIs, P., December 5, 1892, 16 S. E. Rep., 627.
VAREHOUSEMAN.

Liability as. See

CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES, 5.

8. Lienfor Balance Due on Storage.
A warehouseman is entitled to a lien on goods remaining in the
warehouse for a general balance of storage due on all goods stored under

an implied contract. A warehouseman who retains goods for a general
balance of storage under'a single contract is entitled to storage at the
same rate after the time of asserting his lien until payment is made, and
he cannot be deprived of the same on the theory that the storage from
that time on is for his own benefit: Somes v. Shipping Co., 8 H. L., Cas.
338, distinguished; Devereux v. Henning, Circuit Court District of South
Carolina, SIMONTON, D. J., December 20, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 40X.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES, I.
See CoMME.RcIA. LAW, 3.
See WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WILLIAM STRUTHERS EL.IS.1
FEDERAL.
CONTRACT, IMPAIRMENT OF.

i.

Bond-Unauthorized Issue-When Municipal Corporations
are not Estopped to Defend Suit on.

A county issued bonds in excess of the legal limit. The bonds stated
-on their face that they were in compliance with the Act of Assembly.
Held, that inasmuch as the county commissioners were required by an
Act of Assembly to make out semi-annual reports of the taxable property
and the indebtedness of the county, and that such reports were published
and open to the inspection of any one, the county would not be estopped
by the declaration in the bonds from setting up the fact that they were
illegally issued: Lutliff v. Lake County Commissioners, Supreme Court
of the United States, GR.AY, J., January 9, 1893, 147 U. S., 230.
, During the temporary absence of .1r.Ellis the cases are selected
by one of the Editors of the journal.
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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

EMINENT DOMAIN, FEDERAL POWER OF.
2. District of Columbia.
The United States government can exercise all the powers of government, both political and municipal, in the District of Columbia.
Quaere.-As to the limit of the Federal power of eminent domain in
the United States ?
Public Use.-Land devoted to a public park is land devoted to a
public use. Congress can condemn land in the District of Columbia for
a public park.
Whzen Title Passes to Governmen.-The title to land taken undfir
eminent-domain does not pass to the government the moment condemnation proceedings are commenced, or when the report of the appraisers.
is confirmed, but when the compensation is paid (or bond filed?) and,
therefore, no interest can be allowed on the value of the land as estimated,
by the appraisers between the time the proceedings are commenced and.
the government pays the principal sum to those entitled, and also the fact.
that land has been proceeded against and appraised does not commit the
government to taking the same.
Assignment ofBenefits-Quare.-Wheherthe assessment ofbenefits.
on land adjacent to public improvements is a constitutional exercise by
government of the power of taxation or any other power? Shoemaker
v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, SEIRAS,J., January
I6, 1893, 147 U. S., 282.

EXECUTIVE OvFICURS.
3. Additional Dtties Zmosed by Congress.
Congress can impose additional duties on particular executive officers.
in the line of their other duties without violating the constitutional
provision that allofficers shall be appointed by the Presidenf. Requiring
an army engineer to act as appraiser for lands taken by Congress under
eminent domain, is requiring him to act in the line of his duty within
the above definition : Shoemaker . United States, Supreme Court of theUnited States, SHrRAs, J., January r6, 1893, 147 U. S., 282.
JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS.
4. Circuit Courts-Bill in Equity.
A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over a bill in
equity to empower the collection of taxes from assessments, in separate
counties, no one of which amounts to $2ooo, and for which, in case of
payment under protest, separate suits must be brought to recover back
the amounts paid, though the claims are joined in the bill and make an
aggregate of over $2000: Walter v. Northeastern Railroad Co., Supreme
Court of the United States, BROWN, J.,-January 23, 1893, r47 U. S, 370.
5.

PromissoryNotes.

Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States inferior to the Supreme Court, and has done so in the Act
of August [3, 1888, 25 U. S. Statutes, 433,434, chap. 866, which is as follows"Nor shall any Circuit or District Court have cognizance of any suit.

CORPORATIONS.
cxcept upon foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any
promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee or of any
subsequent holder, if such instrument be payable to bearer . . . 'unless
such suit might have been prosecuted in such Court . . . if no assignment has been made." Held, that this prevented a note made by one
man and payable to another, both being citizens of the same State, from
being sued on in the Federal Courts, unless, as was the case here, it could
be shown that the note was made for the accommodation of the payee,
and that the first endorsee was a citizen of another State: Holmes v.
Goldsmith, Supreme Court of the United States, SHIRAS, J., January 9,
1893, 147 U. S., 150.
6. President'sAlleged JudicialDitties.
When the President under an Act of Congress decides that the value
of land to be taken by the United States to establish a park, as found by
a board of appraisers, is reasonable, he does not perform a judicial act,
because he has no power to alter the value or set aside the report, and
the value of the lands has already been judicially determined by the
appraisers: Shoemaker v. United States, Supreme Court of the United
States, SHIRAs, J.. January 13, 1893, 147 U. S., 282.

CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by LEVIs LAWRENCE

SMITH.

BY-LAWS.
i. Eligibilityto Directorship.
The stockholders of a joint-stock corporation have the right to pass
a valid by-law declaring that no person who is attorney against the corporation in a suit shall be eligible as a director. They must be accorded
this power to defend their own interests. It is self-defense only: Cross
v. West Va. Cent. & P. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, December 17, 1892, per BRANNON, J., 16 S.B. Rep., 587.
OFFICERs.
2.

President.

The treasurer of a corporation has no right, under the directions of
the president, to refuse subscription money when tendered, and such an
act does not bind the corporation. It is not the part of the president to
give such directions. If the corporation, however, acquiesces in such
action, the rule is different: Potts v. Wallace, Supreme Court of the
United States, December 12, 1892, per SHIRAS, J., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 196.

3.

Director.

The validity of the election of a director of a company does not

depend upon what he may contemplate doing when elected: Ohio &
Bliss. Ry. Co. et al. v. State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney, Supreme Court
of Ohio, December 20, 1892, P9R CURIAM, 32 N. E. Rep., 933:
27

CORPORATIONS.
STOC]KHOLDUR.

See BY-LAws, supra.

4. Liability of, How Enforced.
In Pennsylvania, in the case of an insolvent corporation, its assets,
including unpaid capital stock, constitute a trust fund, and such fund
cannot be appropriated by individual creditors, by means of attachments
or executions directed against particular assets, butshould be distributed,
on equitable principles, among the creditors at large. Accordingly, it
was ruled by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Lane's Appeal, 1O5
Pa., 49, and in Bell's Appeal, II5 Pa., 88, 8 At. Rep., 177, that a bill in
equity is a proper remedy whereby to subject the property of an insolvent
corporation to the claims of its creditors. Some general expressions were
used in those opinions which seem to countenance the proposition that
the only remedy in each case is by a bill in equity, but an examination
of the facts of the cases, and of the reasoning of the opinions, clearly
shows that what the Court meant was that the proceedings must, in some
form, be a remedy for all, and not for some, of the creditors-,that the
remedy must be co-extensive with the nature of the property as a trust
fund.
It was accordingly held that when the debts of an insolvent company
exceeded its entire assets, including unpaid stock, the assignee for benefit
of creditors might maintain an action at law to recover the amount due
on stock subscription, citing Bank v. Gillespie, 115 Pa., 564: Potts v. Wallace, Supreme Court of the United States, December 12, 1892, per SHIRAS, J., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., I96.
SUBSCRIPTIONS.

S. Religious Societies.
A religious society, for the purpose of liquidating its debt, appointed
a committee to take subscriptions, and voted that the subscribers might
receive the amount of their subscriptions in unsold pews, and that on sale
of pews the proceeds should be divided am6ng the subscribers. The society,
with the acquiescence of persons represented by plaintiffs, discontinued
all assessments on pews, and thereafter relied for funds wholly on voluntary subscriptions, allowing the subscribers to use the unsold pews, and
abandoning all effort to sell the same. The meeting house was finally
sold. It was held that the subscription was a gift, and there was no contract of the society to repay, and there was no obligation on it except to
allow the subscribers to take pews, or the proceeds arising from the sale
thereof, and that the society was not liable, on the ground that by a sale
of the meeting house it had put it beyond its-power to allow the subscribers to take their pay in pews or money arising from the sale thereof,
since the acquiescence by the subscribers in the change from an assessment
to a non-assessment policy shows an abandonment for the benefit of the
society of their rights under the vote, and all parties must be presumed
to have acted in view of the possibility, that circumstances might require
the society to sell or rebuild the meeting house: Lock v. Belmont Congregational Society, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January
4, 1893, per BARK=R, J., 32 N. E. Rep., 949.

CRIMINAL LAW.
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6. Assessments.
A subscriber for stock in a corporation offered, while the company
was solvent, to pay for this stock, but the company refused to receive the
money or to issue the stock to him. The stockholder, however, took no
action to absolve himself from his subscription contract, but continued
active in the company's business. It was held that the offer and its refusal constituted no defense to an action by the assignee of the corporation
to recover on the subscription: Potts v. Wallace, Supreme Court of the
United States, December 12, 1892 , per SHIRAS, J., 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 196.
ULTRA VIRES.
7. Contracts.
Two telegraph companies, A and B, made a written agreement
whereby B was to build and equip certain lines, and connect them with
the lines of A. A was to issue and deliver to B its bonds, secured by a
mortgage on all its property, including the lines contracted for. On the
next day B agreed with the stockholders of A to exchange these A bonds
for A stock in equal amounts. The bonds were issued and exchanged as
agreed; B thereby getting control of A, elected its own officers to the
offices of A, and managing the two companies as one concern. The new
lines were built in part by B, and connected with the A system, B raising
the money therefor by issuing its own bonds secured by mortgage covering after-acquired property. This mortgage was not recorded until after
recording of the A mortgage. B was a New York corporation. Held,
that the agreements, and the acts done in pursuance thereof, were not
ultra vires in respect to B: United Lines Tel. Co. v. Boston Safe Deposit
and Trust Co., Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Fur.LER, January 30, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 395.
VOTING.

8.

Proxy.

Stockholders may place their stock in the hands of a depositary, with
direction to vote it as directed by a committee appointed by themselves,
and subject to their control: Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. State, ex ret. Prosecuting Attorney, Supreme Court of Ohio, December 20, 1892, PER
CURIAM, 32 N. E. Rep., 933-

CRIMINAL LAW.
Cases selected by C. PERCY WILLCOX.
BREAKING AND ENTERING.
I.
What Constitutes.
Where one defendant was let into a store in the night-time by the
clerk on the pretense of desiring to make a purchase, and while the clerk
was in another part of the building getting the article, unbolted the door
and let in a confederate who did the stealing after the pretended purchaser had left, both may be convicted of breaking and entering: Commonwealth v. Lowrey, Supreme Court of Massachusetts, HOLMES, J.,
January 5, 1893, 32 N. E. Rep., 940.

4o8

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.

FELONY.

2.

Grade of Offence.

The possible, and not the actual, sentence is the criterion in determining whether an offence is a felony or not: People v Hughes, Court
of Appeals of New York, FINCH, J., January 17, 1893,32 N. E. Rep.,.io5.
HoMIcrD.
3. Dying Declarations.
Dying declarations are admissible in a trial for murder, as to the
fact of the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor
of the'defendant as well as against him: Mattox v. United States,
Supreme Court of the United States, FULLUR, C. J., November I4, 1892,
13 S..P. Rep., 5o.
POLYGAMY.
4. Cohabitation.
A statute provided that "Whoever, having a former husband or wife
living, marries another person, or continues to cohabit'with such second
husband or wife," should be deemed guilty of pofygamy. Held,that the
word "cohabit" means to continue to live together as husband and wife
ordinarily do, but does not necessarily imply sexual intercourse: Commonwealth v. Lucas, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, FIELD,
C.. J., January 6, 1893, 32 N. R. Rep., 1033.

CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Cases selected by C. PZRCY WILLCoX.
GRAND JURY.
I. Disqualificatonof Grand Juror-Effect of, on Indictment.
It is no objection to the validity of an indictment that one of the
grand jurors made a personal investigation into the guilt of the accused
before the meeting of the Grand Jury: Commonwqalth v. Woodward,
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, ArLrN, J., January 3, 1893,
32 N. ]E. Rep., 939.
TRIAL.
2.

Absence of Judge-Argument.

The judge having left the court room during the argument of the
case before the jury, to go into an adjoining room to prepare his charge,
but where he did not hear the argument. Held to be error, and the
judgment was reversed. "The argument before the jury is a part of the
trial of a cause as well as the introduction of evidence :" Thompson v.
People, Supreme Court of Illinois, CRAIG, J., January 19, 1893, 32 N. ].

Rep., 968.

EQUITY.

EQUITY.
Cases selected by ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
FORFEITURE.

i. Relief in Equity.
A senior lessee who had forfeited his lease (Guffey v. Hukill, 34
W. Va., 49), filed a bill in equity against the landlord and the junior
lessee, praying, inter alia, relief against such forfeiture. The tract of
land in controversy was situated in an oil field, at the time of the senior
lease, partially developed. The senior lessee and those claiming under
him had for more than nine months failed to commence to bore for oil,
and .had failed to pay or deposit for the lessor the $I.33y per month.
Held, under the circumstances of the case, the senior lessee and those
claiming under him are not entitled to be relieved against the forfeiture
by paying such sum. The damages to be looked to are the damages
resulting from the breach of the covenant to bore for oil, and uot the
failure to pay $r.33Y3 per month in lieu thereof; and the damages
resulting from the failure to do the specific thing, viz., to bore for oil, not
being susceptible of pecuniary measurement, and therefore not compensable, the relief from such forfeiture is denied: Guffey v. Hukill,
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, HOLT, J., Aptil 27, 1892,
x6 S. E. Rep., 544.
FRAUD.

2. ParolEvidence Varying Written Instrument.
Parol evidence will not be received to ingraft upon or incorporate
with a valid written contract an agreement made contemporaneously
therewith and inconsistent with its terms. The fraud which will let in
such evidence must be fraud in the procurement of the instrument which
goes to its validity, or some breach of confidence in using a paper
delivered for one purpose by fraudulently perverting it to another:
Guffey v. Hukill, subra.
LIENS.

3. Sale of PersonalProierty.
On a sale of pumping engines for water-works the purchaser
expressly agreed that the seller should have a lien thereon with full right
of possession until the price was paid. On a bill filed to establish and
enforce this lien: Held, that this showed an intent that they should not
become a part of the realty, and under the Pennsylvania decisions this
intent was controlling, and the lien was not waived in favor of the
mortgage bondholders or other creditors by attaching the engines to the
foundation in the usual manner. Nor is there -any public policy which
renders invalid a contractual vendor's .ien upon the pumping engines of
a water company: New Chester Water Co. et al. v. Holly Manufacturing
Co. et al., Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, WALES, D. J.,
November 14, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 19.

4. Vendor's Lien-Foreclosure-Redempztionby Subvendee.
A subvendee of land subject to a vendor's lieu, whose deel has been
duly recorded, and whQ has Ilot bgen made a party to proceedings tQ

] PUITY.
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foreclose the lien, is entitled to redeem from the foreclosure sale,
whether the purchaser is the original vendor or some other person; and
a court of equity will protect his rights when he 'tenders into court the
sum bid by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and asks that it be
applied in payment of the decree: Foster v. Powers, 64 Texas, 247;
Cattle Co. v. Boon, 73 Texas, 548, distinguished; Pierce v. Moreman,
Supreme Courtof Texas, STAYTON, C. J., May 13, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep., 821.
PARTNERSHIP.

'5.

Firn Real Estate-Conversion.

(i) Where real estate is purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes it is partnership property, to which the surviving partner
has an equitable title, and which he may sell to pay partnership debts or
settle partnership'equities, compelling, by aid of a court of equity, the
heirs of the deceased partner to perfect the sale by deeding such title.
(2) In the absence of any agreement.between the partners, express
or implied, to the contrary, both the legal title and the beneficial interest
in the surplus of such partnership real estate, after the debts and the
equities of the partnership are satisfied, descend to the heir at law.
(3) When, however, there is an express agreement between the
partners, or one which can be clearly implied from the circumstances,
to c6nsider and treat such real estate as part of the personal property
stock of the partnership, then, though the legal title to the deceased
partner's interest descends to the heir under the statutes of descent, the
equitable title and the full beneficial interest, after the payment of the
partnership debts and adjustment of the equities between the partners,
vest in the personal representatives of the deceased partner for distribution as personal property, and to this end a court of equity may force a
conveyance of the legal title from the heirs to the vendee of the personal
representatives: Perin v. Megibben, Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit, TAFT, C. J., November i8, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 86.
NoTP.-The tendency in this country is, perhaps, opposed to this
doctrine: Espey v. Conier, 76 Ala., 5oi; Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass.,
i107 ; Leaf's Appeal, io 5 Pa., 505.
SPECIFIC PZRVORMANC4.

6. Compensation as the Alternative.
In a suit against a bank to compel it to register plaintiff as a stockholder for forty shares of stock, or pay the value of the stock and the
dividends- declared thereon as compensation in lieu of the stock, the
defendant demurred, on the ground that plaintiff had a complete remedy
at law. Held, that plaintiff could, in equity, enforce a specific performance by having 'the stock registered in his name, and compel'the issue
of certificates to him, or, in the alternative, if the corporation was unable
to perform its contract, have his remedy by compensation in damages:
Birmingham Nat. Bank v. Roden, Supreme Court of Alabama, COLPEMAN,
J., November 23, 1892, Il So, Rep., 88 .

EVIDENCE.
TRtusT.

7. Dissolution-Oppositionof Trustee.
A court of equity has no power to compel a testamentary trustee to
stipulate for the entry of a judgment declaring the will invalid, and thus
annihilating the trusts created by it, when the design of the trusts has
not been accomplished, and the trustee refuses to consent to its extinguishment, and there is no insuperable obstacle in the way of its complete performance according to the intent of the testator, though the
heirs at law and beneficiaries of the trust have agreed to its dissolution:
2o N. Y. Supp., 336, reversed; Cuthbert v. Chauvet et al., Court of
Appeals of New York, MAYNARD, J., January 17, 1893, 32 N. E. Rep.,
io88.
8. Married Women-SepiarateEstate in Equity-Under Statute
in Ohio.

In order to charge the separate estate of a married woman with her
engagement it must have been made with an intention on her part to
create a charge upon such estite; that is, with reference to the property,
either for its improvement or for her benefit upon its credit. And the
only separate property which can be charged in equity is the separate
property, or the residue of the separate property, that she had at the time
of contracting the engagement sought to be enforced.
The provisions of Rev. St. Ohio, .?, 3108-3111, as existing in isso,
in regard to contracts by married women, whether considered by them4996, 5319, which relate to the remedy
selves or in connection with
merely, do not enlarge the capacity of married women to make contracts, except in the instances specifically mentioned, and therefore confer no power to charge any after-acquired separate estate: Levi v. Earl,
30 Ohio St., 147, followed: Ankeney et al. v. Hannon et al., Supreme
Court of United States, FIELD, J., January 3, 1893, 13 S. C. Rep., 206.
NOTE.-This is the English rule. For discussion of this point see
Bisph. Eq.,

1O3.

EVIDENCE.
Cases selected by HENRY N.

SMALTZ.

DEED.

I. ParolEvidence to defeat Absolute Nature of.
Plaintiff alleged that under oral agreement between himself and
defendant, whereby defendant agreed to loan him money to purchase
land, and a certain ditch and water right appurtenant thereto, the deed
to the property was taken in defendant's name, in order to secure the
money loaned by him, defendant agreeing to convey the property to
plaintiff on repayment of the loan. Defendant claimed that the sale of
the land was an absolute sale to him. Held,that on the issue thus arising,
testimony of the grantor's agent as to negotiations between plaintiff and
himself leading up to and consummating the sale, though defendant was
not present at the time, was propely admitted to show to whom the sale
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was in fact made, and the property included in the sale and intended to
be conveyed by the grantor: Davis v. Hopkins, Supreme Court of
Colorado, GODDARD, J., January 17, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., 70.
DYING DECLARATIONS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3.

INSURANCE.
Cases selected by HoRAcE L. CHEYNEY.
CHANGE .O"INTEREST.
s. Sheriff's Levy.
The delivery of an execution to an officer, followed by a levy thereof
on a stock of goods, does not effect a "change in the interest or title"
of the property, within the meaning of a condition of a fire insurance
policy thereon, providing that it shall be void if any change take place
in the interest, title, etc., whether by legal process or otherwise: Nalradt
v. Phcenix Insurance Company of Hartford, Court of Appeals of New
York, O'BRiN, J., EARL, PUCKHAM and GRAY,, JJ., dissenting.
January 17, 1893, 32 N. R. Rep., 1o63.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNE R.

LONGSTRETH.

4

I IGHWAYS.

I. Adverse Possession.
Where a town has been laid out, and one of the streets, as originally
marked, used by the public for forty-five years, mere non-user of a portion of such street, occasioned by being fenced in with abutting property
for forty years, will not estop the town from reclaiming such portion, or
give title by adverse possession, nor will it amount to an abandonment
by the public: Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan, Supreme Court of Indiana,
CorFrY, C. J., January 3, 1893, 32 N. E. Rep., 1017.
2. Law of the Road.
The Massachusetts' "Law of the Road," providing that when persons traveling in carriages "meet each other on a road, each person shall
reasonably drive his carriage to the right of the middle of the traveled
part of such road," does not regulate the manner in which persons shall
drive when they meet at the junction of two roads: Norris v. Saxton,
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, BARKER, J., January 3, 1893,
32 N. 8. Rep., 954.
IMMIGRATION.
3. ContractLabor Law.
In an action at law by the United States to recover the peniaty for
a violation of the "Contract Labor Law" (Act of February 26, 1885), a
complaint alleging that defendant offered to one of its employees, in
Canada, to continue his employueirt if he would come to the United
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States, and that in consideration of such promise, and in pursuance of
such agreement, he did come to the United States and work for the
defendant, is sufficient to show the acceptance of the offer in Canada:
United States v. Great Falls Railroad Co., United States Circuit Court,
District of Montana, KNOWLES, D. J., November 21, 1892, 53 Fed.
Rep., 77INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
4. Regulation by, Cities.
A legislative grant of power to municipal corporations to regulate
and restrain retail liquor dealing must not be construed, in the absence
of an express declaration to that effect, to confer upon such corporations
the power to defeat statute policy by ordinances inconsistent with State
laws upon the same subject; such, for instance, as an ordinance leaving
the personal fitness of an applicant to the arbitrary decision of Councils,
when such fitness is already regulated by statute: .E parte Theisen,
Supreme Court of Florida, MABRY, J., December 2, 1892, 11 So. Rep.,
901.
LOCAL ASSESSMENT.
5. Enjoining Collection of.
The collection of an assessment will not be enjoined on the ground
that the act under which it is imposed is unconstitutional, nor on the
ground that the officer making the assessment failed to comply with the
statute providing therefor, there being an adequate remedy at law in
both cases: United Lines Telegraph Co. v. Grant, Court of Appeals of
New York, FINcH, J., January 17, 1893, 32 N. R. Rep., ioo6.
MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS.
6.

Limitation of.

A statute providing that cities of a certain class may incur bonded
indebtedness to an amount not exceeding 4 per cent. of their assessed
valuation, though in conflict with Article XIII, 6, of the Constitution,
which provides that cities of such class may become indebted to only 3
per cent. of the value of taxable property therein, is void only to the extent of the repugnancy in fixing the amount at 4 per cent. instead of 3
per cent.; and therefore bonds issued by a city under such act are valid,
if it appears that the debt created is within the constitutional limit:
Dunn v. City of Great Falls, Supreme Court of Montana, PEMBERTON,
C. J., January 23, 1893, 3! Pac. Rep., 1017.
NATIONAL BANKS.

7. Taxation.
When the law of the State requires property to be assessed at its cash
value, the mere fact that property of a national bank was assessed at 85
per cent. of its full value while other property was only assessed at 70
per cent. of its full value, but not through any design or systematic effort
on the part of the assessors, is not such a discrimination against national
banks as to justify an injunction to restrain the collection of the tax :
Albuquerque National Bank v. Perea, Supreme Court of the United States,
BREWER, J., January 3, 1893, 13 S. C. Rep., 194.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE,
STATES.

8. Boundaries between Navigable Rivers.
When a navigable river constitutes the boundaiy between two independent States, the middle of the main channel of the stream, the channel most commonly used for commercial purposes, marks the true
boundary between them, up to which each State will, on its side, exercise
jurisdiction, and not the middle of the great bed of the stream equi-distaut from its banks: State of Iowa v. State of Illinois, Supreme Court of
the United States, FIELD, J., January 3, 1893.
TAXATION.

9. Exempion of Foreign CharitableCorporations.
A statute which exempts property, owned by charitable and religious
corporations, from the collateral inheritance tax, is a grant of corporate
powers and privileges applicable solely to domestic corporations, and a
foreign charitable corporation cannot claim exemption through such
statute; for a grantof powers and privileges'must, in the absence of plain
indications to the contrary, be held to apply only to corporations created
by the State and subject to. its visitation and control: In Re Prime's
Estate, Court of Appeals of New York, ANDitWS, C. 3., January 17,
1893, 32 N. E. Rep., Io9I.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases Selected by ARDEMUS STEWART.
PLEADING.
x. Direct .Allegations-Statementsby Way of Recital.
Whatever facts are necessary to constitute the cause of action must
be directly and distinctly stated, and not by way of recital ; and i actions
for torts, if the facts necessary to state a cause of action are stated under
a quod cum or after "a whereas," such mode of statement must be
'regarded as recital, and such count is fatally defective on general
demurrer: Spiker v. "Bohrer, Supreme Court of Apbeals of West Virginia, ENGLISH, J., December io, 1892, I6 S. E. Rep., 575.
PRACTICE.
FEDERAL COURTS.

2. Removal of Causes-DiverseCitizenship.
A citizen of Massachusetts, who 'resides with his family in that State
most of the year, but owns valuable real estate in South Carolina, where
he comes once a year, or, at the furthest, two years, and spends a month,
may remove from a South Carolina Court to a Federal Court a suit
brought against him by a citizen of South Carolina: Rivers v. Bradley,
Circuit Court, Dist. of South Carolina, SImONOaN, Dist. J., December
23, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 3o5.
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Removal of Causes-DiverseCitizenshib-Resfdene.

A receiver of a railroad company, being a citizen of another State,
may remove an action brought against him in his official capacity for
causing death by wrongful act, although the railroad company itself is a
citizen of the State in which the action is brought: Brisenden v. Chamberlain, Circuit Court, Dist. South Carolina, SIMONTON, Dist. J., December 28, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 307.
4.

Removal of Causes-DiverseCilizenshi-SubstitutedParties.

Where replevin is brought into a State Court by a citizen of the
State against the sheriff of a county therein to recover goods levied on
by writ of attachment, and the plaintiffs in the attachment are substituted for the sheriff as defendants, they, although citizens of another
State, are not entitled to remove the action of replevin to a Circuit Court
of the United States, as the original defendant had no such right: Burnham v. First National Bank of Ldoti, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, SHIRAS, Dist. J., November 14, 1892, 53 Fed. Rep., 163.
JUDGMENT.

5.

ResJudicata.

An adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the.subject-matter
and the parties is final and conclusive, not only as to the matters actually

determined, but as" to every other matter which the parties might have
litigated as incident thereto, and coming within the legitimate purview
of the subject-matter of the action. It is not essential that the matter
should have been formally put in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient
that the status of the suit was such that the parties might have had the
matter disposed of on its merits. An erroneous ruling of the Court will
not prevent the matter from being resjudicata: Rogers v. Rogers, Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, ENGI,ISH, J., December 22, 1892, S. E.
Rep., 633.
PRoCEss.
6. Exemptionfrom Civil Process-Partyto Foreign Suit.
The privilege of exemption from service of a civil process extends to
a non-resident party litigant in a federal court in another State while in
New York attending the taking of testimony before a notary to be used

on the trial.

GRAY,

J., dissenting; 16 N. Y. Supp., 325, reversed: Parker

v. Marco, Court of Appeals of New York, MAYNARD, 1., January 17, 1893,
32

N. E. Rep., 9 99 .

VENUE.

7. Suit ConcerningLand of Decedent in County not his Domicile.
An action to enforce a resulting trust in land of which a decedent
died seised, and in a judgment recovered by him, may be brought in the
county in which the land lies, and in which the judgment was rendered.
even though the decedent died, and his estate was administered upon, in

another county: Reese v. Murnandt et al., Supreme Court of Washington,
STIxs, J., December 13, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 1027.

TORTS.

TORTS.
Cases selected by

ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUER.

ARREST.
i. Wrongful Arrest of Passenger-PunitiveDamages.
For wrongful arrest of a passenger on a railway train by the conductor, the railroad company is not liable to punitive damages in addition
to such damages as will compensate the passenger for his outlay and injured feelings, merely on the ground that the conductor's illegal conduct
was wanton and oppressive, where it was not shown that he was known
to the company to be an unsuitable person, or that it participated in, ap
proved, or ratified his treatment of the passenger. And this question of
punitive damages is not one of local law, but of general jurisprudence,
and in the decision of which the Supreme Court of the United States is
not controlled by State law: Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,
Supreme Court of the United States, January 3, 1893, per GRAY, J., 13
Supt. Ct. Rep., 261.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
2.

Advice of Counsel as a Defence.

It is no defense to an action for malicious prosecution that the prosecutor first obtained the opinion of counsel as to the guilt of the accused,
where it appears that the prosecution- was instituted for the mere purpose
of forcing the collection of a debt without probable cause, since the
advice of counsel will not shield one from the consequence of his wrongful act done, not in good faith upon such advice, but with the sinister
motive of personal gain: Neufeld, et al., v. Rodeminski, Supreme Court
of Illinois, January 19, 1893, per SHOPE, J., 32 N. B. Rep., 913.
NEGLIGENCE.

3.

ContributoryNegligence-Absence of "Tell-tales" at Overhead
Bridge.
In an action by the mother of deceased against a railroad company
for the death of the rear, brakeman on a freight train, caused by defendant's negligence, there was evidence that when deceased's train left a
station he was ordered to get on top of 'atall refrigerator car attached to
the rear of the caboose; that he was seen getting on the:car, holding to
the brake wheel; that his duty required him to watch the rear end of the
train; that he was skillful in his business, and had entered defendant's
service about two weeks prior to his death; that he was knocked off the
car and killed by a bridge under which"his train passed a few miles from
the station; and that the tell-tales to the bridge were gone, and had been
for several days prior to the accident. Held, that the evidence justified
the inference that deceased was exercising due care, since be was not
required to look out for a bridge, only when warned by the tell-tales:
Maher v.Boston & A. R. Co., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
per BARKER, J., January 5, 1893, 32 N. E. Rep., 950.

PROPERTV.
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4. Risk of Employment.
A railroad switchman, who has been employed as such in a switchyard for more than two months, being a man of mature age, assumes the
risks incident to coupling cars belonging to other roads which have
double deadwoods or bumpers of unusual length, although the cars
belonging to his employer are not thus equipped; for a railroad company
is not guilty of negligence in receiving into its yards, and passing over
its lines, cars different from those owned by itself: Kohn v. McNulta,
Supreme Court of United States, per BREWER, J., January j6, 1893, 13
Sup. Ct. Rep., 298.
NUISANCE.
5. Noxious Gases.
When a company, engaged in burning brick upon leased land, uses
a process in burning that generates noxious gases that are wafted upon
the adjacent lands of the lessor, injuring and destroying a growing crop
of wheat, this is such a nuisance that the lessor may maintain an action
to recover damages by reason thereof: Fogarty v. Junction City Pressed
Brick Co., per SImPSO-N, C., Supreme Court of Kansas, January 7, 1893,
31 Pac. Rep., 1052.

PROPERTY.
Cases selected by NVILIAm A. DAVIS.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
I. DisputedBoundary.
In ejectment proceedings, a division fence was built by mistake, and
maintained for more than the statutory period over the line on plaintiff's
land. Defendant and his grantors claimed to own the land to the fence,
and had had actual possession of it during the time. Held, that such
possession was adverse, though the acquiescence of plaintiff was because
he supposed the fence was on the true line: Ramsey v. Ogden, Supreme
Court of Oregon, LORD, C. J., January 2, 1893, 31 Pac. Rep., 778.

DEED.
2. Acknowledgment-Authority of Deputy Clerk.
The United States Statute of 1878, Chap. xL, Par. 7, provides for the
acknowledgment of deeds before clerks of courts of record of sister
States. Held, that a certificate of acknowledgment of a deed by a deputy
of such clerk, in the name of his principal, and duly authenticated by the
clerk's official seal, is sufficient to entitle such deed to be recorded: Piper
vu.Iron Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota, VANDERVAUGH, J., December
5, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 53.
3.

Advancements.

Whether a conveyance or transfer of property from parent to child
is an advancement depends on the intention of the parent in making it,
and it will be presumed to be such until it otherwise appears from the

PROPERTY.
deed or other evidence: Roberts et al. v. Cole'man et al., Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, BRANNON, I., December 3, 1892, 16 S. E.
Rep., 482.
4. Conditions-Estoppel.
The acceptance of the deed and the enjoyment of the estate estop
the grantee from denying the covenants and conditions therein to be
performed by him: Roberts et al. v. Coleman et al., Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, BRANNON, J., December 3, 1892, 16 S. R.
Rep., 482.
5. Description of Real Estate Conveyed.
An instrument of sale conveyed, "that certain store, and all the
stock and goods therein, and the bakery attached thereto, and the tools
and fixtures of said bakery." Held,that this instrument conveyed the
land on which the store and bakery attachment stand, and so much as
may be necessary for their ordinary use: Pottkamp v. Buss et al., Supreme
Court of California, P.R CURIAM, December 8, 1892, 3r Pac. Rep., 1121.
HUSBAND AND WIF.
6. Purchase of Property by Wife-Presumiftions-Liabilityfor
Husband'sDebts.
Where property is alleged to have been purchased by a wife, or a
conveyance of property is made to her during coverture, the burden is on
her to prove distinctly that she paid for it with means not derived from
her husband. Evidence that she made the purchase, or that the property
was conveyed to her, amounts to nothing unless accompanied by clear
and full proof that she paid for it with her own separate estate; and in
the absence of such proof the presumption is that her husband furnished
the means to pay for it, and it will be subject to his debts: Brocks el al.
v. Applegate, Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, BRANNON, J.,
December 17, 1892, x6 S. E. Rep., 585.
PUBLIC LANDS.

7. Access to Water Obstructedby Railroad-MeasureofDamages.
In an action again'st a railroad company by riparian owners for
damages to their uplands, caused by construction of defendant's road-bed
across, the plaintiffs' water front, thereby cutting off their access to the
river, plaintiffs may show that the lands were in condition for use as a
brick yard but for the obstruction complained of, and that tenants were
ready to lease it for that purpose provided access to the river.
could be obtained; and plaintiffs' measure of damages is the difference
between the usable or rental value of the land witlh the obstruction and
such value without obstruction: Rumsey et al., v. N. Y. & N' E. R.R1 Co.,
Court of Appeals of New York, PncKHAm, J., January 17, 1893, 32 N. E.
Rep., 979.
8. Alluvion-Boundaries.
The owner of a city lot, bounded on one side by a street, is not
entitled, as a riparian proprietor, to lands formed by accretions on the
opposite side of the street: Ellinger v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Missouri, MACFARLAND, J., December 6, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep.,
8oo.
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Cases selected by

MAURICE G. ]BELKNAP.

ADMINISTRATOR.

j. Sale Setting Aside-Equities to be Adjusted.
In an action to set aside as fraudulent an administrator's sale of
land, where it appears that the administrator had paid out of the proceeds certain debts with which the land was chargeable, a plaintiff,
claiming by descent, cannot recover without first repaying to the purchaser the amount so paid out by the administrator. There is no difference in principle, whether the heirs themselves received the money, or
whether the money was paid in satisfaction of a debt for which the land
was liable: Fisher v. Bush, Supreme Court of Indiana, OrDS, J., December 2r, 1892, 32 N. R. Rep., 924.
Setting Aside Sale-Notice of Fiduciary Relation of Purchaser.
Where the record of an administrator's sale showed that the administrator's attorneys were the firm of "O'Brien & Graham," without
giving their Christian names, and that the purchaser at the sale was one
Robert Graham, it was held, that such information was sufficient to have
put subsequent purchasers on inquiry as to whether Robert Graham was
one of the administrator's attorneys. The connection between the facts
disclosed by the record, and the further facts to be discovered, were such
as that the former could be said to furnish a reasonable and natural clue
to the latter: Fisher v. Bush, supra.
2.

3, Statute of Limitations-Possession of Intestate'sLand.
Where an administrator has failed to apply the rents and profits of
land in his possession, and belonging to the estate, to the payment of his
intestate's debts, for which purpose he took possession, the Statute of
Iimitations does not begin to run in his favor, and against the heirs,
until a demand by them for the payment of such rents and profits, and a
refusal by him: Shuffler v. Turner, Supreme Court of North Carolina
BURW ELL, J., December 20, 1892, 16 S. E. Rep., 417.
FXECUTORS.

4. Loan to Exzecutor-Subrogation.
One lending money to an executor to pay debts of the estate is
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of creditors, but only an account
showing the indebtedness which has been discharged, and the balance
due the executor from the estate. De Concilio v. Brownregg, Court
of Chancery of New Jersey, PITNEY, V. C., November 25, 1892, 25 AtI.
Rep., 383.
5. Rights of Legateesto Follow Assets.
Where a decree has been entered against an executor acting under
the will without surety, charging him with assets sufficient to pay all
the legacies, the legatees are relegated to the personal responsibility of
the executor, and are in no more favorable position than all other of
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his creditors, should they fail to assert their rights against him until he
becomes insolvent. Bellows v. Sowles, Circuit Court of United States
for the District of Vermont, December 13, 1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 325.
Wirrs.
6. Interpiretation-RealEstate-Conversion.
A will authorizing the trustees thereunder to sell any of the property, and directing them to invest the proceeds "so as to be safe, and
produce income," and to pay the income to testator's wife and children
for their lives, remainder over, construed as intending the trustees
should so change and invest the estate as to make it all productive of
income; does not mean that the unproductive real estate of testator
shall be treated as converted as of the day of his death, so that only
such portion of the purchase money wduld be principal as, with interest
from testator's death to the day of sale, would equal the entire amount
realized, and that the difference between the two 'amounts should be
distributed as income, but the entire amount must be treated as
principal: Hite v. Hite, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, HoYT, C. J.,
December 17, 1892; S. W. Rep., 778.

7. Perpetuities.
A devise to executors with a direction to convert into money as
soon after the testator's decease "as they can conveniently do so," is
not an illegal suspension of the power of alienation. The fact that such
conversion might require a period of time, not measured by lives, does
not create an unlawful perpetuity. Such result is accomplished only
when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. The discretionary power conferred upon executors with respect to the time of sale does not suspend the power of
sale or the absolute ownership. The circumstance of it being within
the legal power of the executors to convert the whole estate into money
the day after their appointment constitutes a sufficient answer to the
contention that the absolute ownership is suspended: Hope v. Brewer,
Court of Appeals of New York, O'BR=IN, J., November 29, 32 N. E.
Rep., 558.
8. Perpetuities-Conflidof Laws.
-A bequest to foreign trustees on a trust which is valid under the law
of the trustees' domicile, where it is to be administer&d, will be enforced
in the State or country of the testator's domicile, though the trust is
repugnant to its statute of perpetuities: Hope v. Brewer, Court of Appeals
of New York, O'BRInN, J., November 29,'1882, 32 N. B. Rep., 558.

